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ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN ETHICS: 
THE CHOICE OF DEATH IN A MEDICAL CONTEXT 
by Margaret A. Farley 
All religious and cultural traditions have incorporated moral as-
sessments of choices regarding human death. These choices appear in 
contexts of individual self-defense, war, criminal sanctions, debility 
and old age, and a variety of other situations where life and death ap-
pear to conflict and the balance between chem threatens to rile in the 
direction of death. 
Though clear norms have governed many of these contexts, am-
bivalence and ambiguity have not always been overcome. Jewish and 
Christian traditions, so profoundly influential in western culcure, 
have not escaped ambiguity and internal controversy regarding some 
questions of human life and death. 
Ambivalence in the Christian tradition, for example, has in some 
respects increased over the centuries. In the first three hundred years 
of the life of the church, there was a strong prohibition against caking 
any human life, even in self-defense (though one could lay down 
one's life in martyrdom, for there was not a corresponding absolute 
obligation to preserve life in every circumstance). 1 The attitude to-
ward war was generally one of pacifism. Justin Martyr could write 
confidently chat "The Christian must not resist attack." Origen main-
tained chat the Christian lawmaker must not allow killing at all. 
Ambrose, in the fourth century, taught chat the Christian could not 
take the life of another even to save his own life. By the time Saint 
Augustine was writing and preaching, however, the prohibition 
against killing was less absolute. The fifth commandment still yielded 
a prohibition against private individuals killing either themselves or 
another; but now there could be justification for a Christian's engag-
ing in warfare. With the beginning of a Christian version of "just 
war" theory, Christians could be not only soldiers but magistrates 
leading armies to war; and they could be hangmen performing as 
agents of justifiable capital punishment. In the middle ages, the pro-
hibition against murder (taking the life of innocent persons) was 
clear, as was a prohibition against suicide; but the right of the state to 
wage war and to impose capital punishment, and the right of indi-
viduals to self-defense, were now formulated and accepted. Indeed, 
gradually there developed a full-scale casuistry regarding the meaning 
and application of the right to self-defense. 
Today, questions about death and dying have become more than 
ever before complex and troubling. Apart from issues of war, revolu-
tion, capital punishment, and abortion, almost all of us in western 
culture are faced with multiple options regarding our own and our 
loved ones' dying. My topic this evening focuses primarily on issues 
regarding death in a medical context-issues that are raised for us in 
large part by developments in medical technology, technology whose 
possibilities have fueled a cultural need and pressure to expand the 
horizons of death through scientific power. 
The range of moral options in response to the use of medical tech-
nology near the end of life perhaps needs no detailing here. It in-
cludes everything from preserving life as long as possible no matter 
what the cost, to ending life by our own hand before it becomes what 
we fear will be intolerable; from agreeing to Do Not Resuscitate or-
ders in hospital settings, to specifying orders for Limitation of Treat-
ment that extends to the use of ventilators, artificial modes of 
nutrition, etc.; from formulating Living Wills to granting Medical 
Durable Power of Attorney so that we will not be left without an arm 
of agency in the midst of the medical world. These options are all too 
familiar to us; we know them through various communications media 
and through direct experience in our personal lives and our profes-
s10ns. 
To focus our considerations this evening, I am going to try to do 
three things: (1) to identify some of the larger issues that underlie the 
choices we may make regarding our own and others' deaths; (2) to 
indicate some of the ethical boundaries and distinctions that have tra-
ditionally been important in evaluating specific choices in relation to 
human death; (3) to probe arguments both for and against changes in 
the law that would extend the range of individual choices regarding 
our dying. In addressing these three tasks, I have a concern to resist 
the polarization and politicization of the issue of euthanasia in the 
manner we have experienced with the issue of abortion. 
Underlying Issues 
The issues I have in mind here are philosophical (and medical and 
legal) but finally religious (and hence theological) issues. They are is-
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sues deep within both Judaism and Christianity, and they have ana-
logues in other world religions. A way to identify them briefly is to 
reflect on two convictions that are lodged in our attitudes toward hu-
man dying. On the one hand, life is a fundamental good. It is a gift 
from God, to be held as a gift is held, with reverence and respect; it is 
to be stewarded, cared for as something that is our own yet not only 
our own to be done with simply as we please. A sign that life is this 
kind of a value for us, this kind of a gift, is God's command to us: 
"Thou shalt not kill" (Exodus 20: 13). The command appears in legal 
and prophetic traditions in the Hebrew scriptures and in the teach-
ings of Jesus in the Christian scriptures, articulated along with im-
peratives neither to kill or to be angry, and not to despair in the face 
of suffering. We interpret this command not only as a negative prohi-
bition against killing but as a positive prescription-so that, for ex-
ample, as Karl Barth expresses it: Thou shalt will to live, and even will 
to be healthy. 2 "The freedom for life to which the human is sum-
moned by the command of God is the freedom to treat as a loan both 
the life of all persons with one's own and one's own with that of all 
human persons."3 Or, as the American Catholic bishops put it in 
their document on the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration: 
The Judea-Christian tradition celebrates life as the gift of a 
loving God and respects the life of each human being because 
each is made in the image and likeness of God. As Christians 
we also believe we are redeemed by Christ and called to share 
eternal life with him .... Our church views life as a sacred trust, 
a gift over which we are given stewardship and not absolute 
dominion.4 
The value of human life, then, and its ultimate ownership, is re-
vealed in God's command and in the story of God's relationship to 
humanity. And there are other indications that life is a fundamental 
value and a gift, our own but not only our own-that is, indications 
not provided directly through God's special revelation. For example, 
some have recognized in human "nature" itself a basic drive toward 
life, a desire to live, indicative of a moral "law," an obligation to pre-
serve human life. Others have found this good of life in their love for 
one another, experiencing in relation to a beloved a revelation of the 
value of life such that an intention to kill cannot be a part of what 
love requires. Others have maintained that life is valuable at least as 
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the necessary condition for human persons to have and to enjoy other 
values. Still others have argued that respect for the life of each indi-
vidual is necessary for the common good of the human community. 
On all of these counts, life is to be preserved-as a good that is pre-
cious to God, to the community, and to each person. 
But if this is one conviction, religiously and philosophically af-
firmed, that human life is a fundamental good, there is a second: Life 
is not an absolute good, not the supreme value for humans. Thus, 
Karl Barth can qualify the command, "Thou shalt will to live," with 
the paradoxical formulation, "[but] not will to live unconditionally, ... 
rather will to stake and surrender [one's life], and perhaps be prepared 
to die."5 And the Catholic bishops can write: "As conscientious stew-
ards we have a duty to preserve life, while recognizing certain limits to 
that duty."6 So that, as the ethicist and legal theorist Richard Stith has 
put it: There are these two intuitions: Life must not be destroyed, but 
it need not always be preserved. Every person is utterly valuable, and 
each one's life is utterly valuable, yet things other than life are some-
times more valuable. Human life deserves respect; it even has sanctity; 
but death may sometimes be welcomed.7 
We are therefore faced with serious questions: What are the limits 
to our obligation to preserve life? and, is the prohibition against tak-
ing life, against intending death, absolute? When we begin to reflect 
on these questions, we tend to do at least two things. First, we iden-
tify limits, boundaries, to our obligations regarding human life. In or-
der to do so, we ask what are the conditions under which life must 
always be preserved? If physical life in this world is not an absolute 
good, to what other goods is it relative? What other values might, 
under what circumstances, take priority over life? And second 
(though relatedly), we consider distinctions. We differentiate between 
kinds of choices in order to see whether some of them may be morally 
justified though others may not. We distinguish, for example, be-
tween choices to kill and choices to let die. Let me say something 
briefly about each of these two strategies. 
Limits and Distinctions 
Limits to the Obligation to Preserve Life 
While my focus this evening is on choices in a medical context, it 
is helpful to consider more generally the limitations that have been 
4 
proposed or acknowledged regarding the obligation to preserve hu-
man life. None of these is without controversy, but they indicate the 
willingness of most persons to relativize in some way the value of hu-
man life. It is, actually, difficult to find anyone who finally wants to 
make of life in this world an absolute value. For example, when it 
comes to questions of war, those who think that some wars can be 
justified are willing to relativize the lives of their enemies; those who 
are absolute pacifists are willing to relativize their own lives. 
Some of the candidates for limits to the obligation to preserve life 
(which is not to be equated with limits to the obligation not to kill) 
include the following: 
1. Personal integrity and moral or religious witness: For the 
martyr, life is less valuable than the integrity of her or his faith 
or moral commitments; it may also be of less value than wit-
nessing to what is believed to be right and true. 
2. Conflict between human lives: There are situations in which 
the value of one or more individuals' lives comes into conflict 
with the value of another's. Criteria have been developed to 
justify the limiting of efforts to preserve some lives when all 
cannot be preserved. Examples of situations where these apply 
include self-defense; scarcity of resources (as when triage methods 
are used or more general policies are developed for rationing 
access to medical treatments); conflict between individual and 
common good (as when capital punishment is justified as a de-
terrent to crime). 
3. Individual autonomy: The free choice of an individual sets 
some limits to the obligation of another to preserve that indi-
vidual's life, as when an individual's refusal of medical treat-
ment takes priority over the beneficent wishes and actions of 
medical caregivers. 
4. Quality of life: A conflict of values can occur for and with-
in an individual person for whom there is a "totality" of value. 
Physical life is a condition for every other value enjoyed by the 
individual in this life, but as a condition it is for the sake of the 
person as a whole. 
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Thus, the loss of present and future conscious awareness, of 
the ability to relate with others, of the possibility of a life free 
from intractable and personality-changing pain, etc., may rela-
tivize the value of ongoing sheer biological existence and limit 
the obligation to preserve one's own or another's life under 
such circumstances. 
5. Medical futility: The ineffectiveness of some forms of activity 
(for example, medical treatment) to extend the life of a patient 
(or to extend it with a reasonable quality oflife for the person 
as a whole) sets a limit to the obligation to attempt to preserve 
that life. 
To identify limits to the obligation to preserve life helps us see 
how life is a value but a relative value; it is a way of gaining clarity on 
what life is relative to; it provides us with a perspective from which we 
may ask whether or not we are truly obliged to preserve a particular 
life, our own or another's. Yet categories of "limits" in this sense do 
not by themselves resolve the questions about preserving life (and 
staving off death) that arise for us in the concrete. They are necessary 
but not sufficient for our moral discernment in this regard. We need 
additional conceptual tools such as descriptions of moral actions in 
terms of their intentions and their circumstances. Descriptions allow 
distinctions, and distinctions serve discernment. 
Distinctions Among Choices Regarding Death 
Some choices regarding death can be morally justified, some can-
not; and among the choices that are potentially justifiable, some are 
more easily justified than others. So general a statement is hardly con-
troversial, but a great deal of controversy surrounds every effort to 
specify it. Prior to its specification, therefore, a preliminary comment 
may be in order. 
There is an ironic twofold problem with distinguishing the moral 
status of different choices regarding death. On the one hand, relying 
too strongly on such distinctions to solve our moral questions regard-
ing death can obscure the real problems we face. I hope to show this 
in what follows. But on the other hand, blurring the distinctions 
among these choices can compound the problems we face. This is 
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most dangerous when we lump together all sorts of choices regarding 
death (in a medical context) under one category and call it "euthana-
. " Sia. 
This, I am afraid, is a temptation for advocates of the left and of 
the right on these issues. Even those who otherwise take distinctions 
seriously, such as the writers of official documents for the Roman 
Catholic community, contribute to confusion when they define eu-
thanasia as "an action or omission which of itself or by intention 
causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be elimi-
nated. " 8 Important distinctions are contained in this definition 
(based on concepts such as "intention" and "cause"), but they are all 
too often invisible under the large umbrella of the oversimplified cat-
egory, "euthanasia." 
The kinds of distinctions I have in mind appear at three levels. ( 1) 
The first is a distinction between so-called active and passive euthana-
sia, or more accurately, actively taking life (killing) on the one hand, 
and letting someone die (omitting what would otherwise preserve 
someone's life), on the other. (2) The second is a distinction that fur-
ther divides the possibilities of passive euthanasia (or letting die); it is 
a distinction based on the circumstances of the patient, and it has tra-
ditionally been referred to in considerations of ordinary versus ex-
traordinary means. (3) Finally, there is a distinction chat divides the 
possibilities of active euthanasia; it is the distinction between what 
has traditionally been called direct versus indirect active causing of 
death. All of these distinctions have been in the tradition of Roman 
Catholic moral theology for a long time, and they have also func-
tioned significantly in contemporary medical ethics. It is not neces-
sary for me, therefore, to provide a full discussion of them, but only 
to point to them in a way that suggests my own conviction that they 
remain important to our discernment of choices regarding death. 
First, then, the distinction between killing and letting die: It is a 
distinction that is today heavily challenged. In contexts where "letting 
die" means pulling a plug, it is not so simple to distinguish it from a 
lethal injection intended to kill. In either case, of course, the result is 
death. Those who conclude that there is, therefore, no moral distinc-
tion to be drawn between these choices, these "actions," charge chat 
the distinction is speciously maintained in "bad faith" by those who 
want to escape the responsibility of their choices. What reasons can 
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be given, then, to preserve the distinction between active and passive 
euthanasia? The key elements in a distinguishing description of these 
two options are that to let die (as opposed to actively killing) need not 
be to intend death or actively to cause it, though it is to accept it (for 
the consequences of not-doing will indeed be death in most in-
stances) and to be the occasion of it. A sign that one need not be in-
tending death is that should the patient continue to live, despite the 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment, one would not consider 
one's aims frustrated; and the active cause of the death when it does 
take place is not immediately one's omission of treatment but the un-
derlying disease process that brings the person to the brink of death 
in the first place. 
But why would these distinguishing features change the moral sta-
tus of one's choices? Here disagreement runs deep. Nonetheless, 
those who want to maintain this distinction (including myself) argue 
that to accept death, to allow it and provide an occasion for it by re-
moving unreasonable barriers,9 is not to violate the value of human 
life-not to violate it as a divine gift, a fundamental drive within the 
heart of the human individual, a good of great importance to the hu-
man community. It is indeed to accept the inevitable process of dying 
that is a part of human living. 
The descriptive difference between active and passive euthanasia is 
not trivial, even though each represents a choice whose consequence 
is death and each requires morally justifying reasons. Indeed, because 
the consequence (foreseen if not intended) of each is death, there can 
be no avoidance of moral responsibility for omitting treatment, any 
more than there can be for actively and directly killing someone. In 
other words, there must be justifying reasons if a choice to let some-
one die is to be a morally good choice. These reasons emerge in the 
further distinction to be drawn between ordinary and extraordinary 
means. 
This second distinction has been signaled with a variety of terms 
ordinary/ extraordinary, obligatory/ optional, beneficial/burdensome, 
medically indicated/not indicated, etc. 10 The point of the struggle for 
appropriate terminology is to express most clearly a concrete situation-
al difference that yields either an obligation, or not an obligation, to 
treat in a particular way. The distinction is not one of customary ver-
sus unusual treatment, nor is it one that can be cap- cured by identify-
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ing general categories, kinds, of treatments. Its meaning is circum-
stantial, situational, in that it refers to the proportionate benefit and 
burden of a particular treatment relative to a particular patient. It is a 
matter of medical and personal discernment as to what counts mor-
ally as an "excessive" burden or what counts morally as an acceptable 
benefit. 11 The point of the distinction, however, is that some discern-
ment of this sort is required if one is to justify omitting (withholding 
or withdrawing) some form of medical treatment. 
To maintain that passive euthanasia can be justified in some situa-
tions is not to suggest that active euthanasia cannot also be justified. 
The third distinction I have noted, between direct and indirect active 
euthanasia, has offered a traditional way to allow for a morally justi-
fied limited form of action to hasten death. The distinction is often a 
subtle one, and it is not helpful in many cases. Its clearest application 
is in cases where action is taken to alleviate pain even though the 
medication given may hasten the process of dying. Here, too, the dis-
tinction rests upon clarification of what is directly intended (relief 
from pain) as opposed to what is foreseen as a consequence and hence 
held in a complex act of choice only by indirect intention (death). 12 
As I have said, it is not possible for me here to provide a full ac-
count of the meaning of these distinctions or the controversy that 
presently surrounds them. I am assuming some familiarity with them 
and raising them up because I believe in their continued importance 
for ethical discernment and for the forging of policies regarding 
choices of death. But let me here return to the question of why a dis-
tinction between active and passive euthanasia remains morally sig-
nificant, and along with this, the question of why a distinction 
between direct and indirect active euthanasia is significant morally. 
The answer has two parts. First, there is a profound difference (at 
least for many persons) in the moral experience of letting someone 
die and the moral experience of actively killing someone; and there is 
a profound difference (at least for some persons) in the moral experi-
ence of giving an individual medication to alleviate pain and giving 
an individual medication with the precise and direct intention of kill-
ing her. It will not do to dismiss these differences in experience (in the 
perception, the judgment, the self-determined goal, of what one is 
doing) as illusory or self-deceptive, as the residue of a taboo morality 
that will disappear under critical scrutiny. Granted (and seriously and 
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acknowledged) that omission must have justifying reasons (just as 
commission), and that indirect causing of death must be justified by 
grave reasons (in some sense, just as direct killing must be), there is 
nonetheless a profound difference in the moral experience of letting 
life go and actively, directly, taking it. The grounds of this experience 
may be several, but it can be rationally described and supported. 13 To 
reject it out of hand may be to change drastically the moral sensibili-
ties of individuals and a culture. This is why disagreement about these 
moral experiences, experiences of moral obligation, run so deep. le is 
also why our debates about chem require such respect and such care. 
This leads me to the second part of an answer to the question of 
why the distinctions between active and passive euthanasia, and be-
tween direct and indirect active euthanasia, remain morally signifi-
cant. They play an important role in our assessment of options in the 
realm of public policy. If the line is drawn against the active, direct, 
taking of life in a medical context, it secures a line against expanding 
the population of those for whom decisions of death can be made. It 
prevents us from making decisions of death for persons who are vul-
nerable by reason of poverty, age, race, mental acuity, or whatever sta-
tus makes their life appear to be of less value to society than the lives 
of others. It limits our choices of death to populations whose death is 
inevitable when medical treatment is deemed unreasonably burden-
some to them, and populations for whom the obligation to care in a 
medical context focuses on providing them comfort in the face ofter-
rible pain. 
I am, therefore, prepared to argue that choices for death may be 
more easily justified when they are choices to let a life go, under cir-
cumstances in which the burdens of preserving life outweigh the ben-
efits (for the one who is dying); and when the hastening of death is 
the secondary and not directly intended result of reasoned decisions 
to provide positive remedies for pain. These choices need not be made 
in the kind of "bad faith" that slips out from under true moral re-
sponsibility. They require moral justification; they are the result of 
discernment; they draw on legitimate and significant distinctions 
among moral choices; they ratify the value of human life as gift and as 
responsibility. 
Yet, as I have said, the application of such distinctions does not 
finally resolve all of our quandaries regarding the welcoming of death 
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in the context of sickness and debility. There remains the question of 
whether or not direct and active intervention with the intention to 
kill can ever be justified. Indeed, one of the most urgent issues that 
faces us as a society now is the issue of directly ending lives marked by 
great suffering and caught in a prolonged process of dying-issues, 
that is, of active euthanasia and of assisted suicide. Widespread and 
growing public support of the decriminalization of these options re-
flects a general cultural (and religious) shift in evaluations of suicide; 14 
it also represents deep fears in anticipation of the circumstances of 
sickness and death. 
In large part, our fears are of being given too much medical treat-
ment, being kept alive too long, dying not at peace but in a wild 
frenzy of efforts to give us a little more time to live. The radical possi-
bilities introduced by modern medicine lead ironically to scenarios of 
dying that have become unacceptable to many individuals. To more 
and more persons, it appears that the only way to retain some control 
over our death-to die a death marked by conscious self-awareness, 
with knowledge of our ending, surrounded by those we love-is to 
take our death into our own hands. It begins to make sense that while 
science has made death an enemy (to be fought on the battlefield of 
medicine), so science must come to befriend death, to assist us scien-
tifically in dying as we choose. This is part of the point of proposals 
for physician-assisted suicide and for voluntary active euthanasia. 
The debate surrounding these proposals intensifies weekly in al-
most every state of our nation, and the polarization of positions 
threatens to become as intractable as our polarization over the issue of 
abortion. It is not possible for me tonight to address what is at stake 
in anything like an adequate manner; hence, it will not be surprising 
if what I offer is unsatisfying to persons presently on either side of the 
question. There may also be dissatisfaction on all sides because I will 
not shape what I say as an advocacy position for or against the pro-
posals before us. What I want to do, briefly, is to reflect on the major 
arguments that surround these proposals and to do so against the 
background of the underlying principles and moral distinctions that I 
have just outlined. 
Active Taking of Life in a Medical Context 
The issues that surround the active taking of life in the context of 
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sickness and dying are most often joined, it seems to me, in three 
ways. First, individual choice (or individual autonomy) competes 
with community interests (or with perceptions of the common good). 
What is frequently identified as a "right to die" conflicts with a con-
cern to protect society from a "slippery slope" of abuses that will ulti-
mately violate the clearer and prior rights of the majority of citizens. 
Second, arguments for the moral legitimacy of a choice to die (by an 
active taking oflife) conflict with arguments for a strong prohibition 
against such a choice. In other words, the issue is not joined merely 
over the right of the individual versus the good of the community, 
but over the evaluation of the moral goodness or evil intrinsic to ac-
tive euthanasia and assisted suicide. Third, the issue is joined over 
competing assessments (competing predictions) of the social conse-
quences of the legalization of a right to choose death. These three 
ways of joining the issues are obviously closely related. 
I will not attempt here to adjudicate the three conflicts, but only 
to reflect in a particular way on the second and third. (This does not 
signal a judgment that the first issue-regarding the sheer right of 
choice on the part of the individual to choose death-is unimportant, 
but only that I am limited here in time. Moreover, the second and 
third sets of arguments have significant implications for adjudicating 
the first.) I will address the second and third within the context of a 
particular faith community, the Roman Catholic community. I do so 
both because of my audience here this evening and because the 
Catholic community is one whose voice promises to be significant in 
our national debate on these questions. 
Moral Elements in the Choice to Take Life 
Let me, then, consider for a moment arguments for and against 
the moral legitimacy of a choice to die. I have already pointed to the 
major reasons for maintaining that we ought not to take our own life 
or to ask another to take it for us. To repeat them quickly: (1) Our 
life is not our own; it belongs to God; it is God's prerogative to decide 
when our life must end in this world. (2) It is the law of nature to 
preserve our life as long as we are able; while there are limits to our 
power to do so and to our reasonable obligation to do so, we must 
not give in too quickly to the forces of death, not refuse the burdens 
of our whole life or cut off prematurely its possibilities. (3) We are es-
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sentially social beings, and to take our life by our own decision is to 
injure the community (our family, our friends, and the wider com-
munities to which we belong). 
On the other side of this issue, specific counterarguments are 
mounted-for example, to characterize the free agency of the one 
who is to die as the only morally significant feature of the choice to 
die; to deny that God holds (or wants) complete control over our dy-
ing; to reject a notion of "natural law"; to construe community on the 
model of an ecosystem where the demise of some is nature's way of 
making room for others. Perhaps most frequently it is argued that the 
suffering of the one dying overrides all other considerations that oth-
erwise would make the active taking of human life immoral. All of 
these are extremely important arguments to assess, even within the 
Catholic tradition. But within this context they suggest questions of a 
particular sort, questions through which the issues may be seriously 
joined and strongly pressed either to resolution or to deeper levels of 
conflict. 
For example, for those who believe that God is their ultimate des-
tiny-their beginning and their end, their holder in life and savior in 
death-is it not conceivable that profound "acceptance" of death, ac-
knowledgment of an ending that is indeed God's will, can be ex-
pressed through action as well as through passion, through doing as 
well as being done unto? For those who believe that they are called to 
resist the forces of diminishment and death as long as they can, and 
to surrender in the end not to evil (or even to sickness) but to God, 
can this never take the form of an active decision to die? Or better, 
does it not always, at its most profound and radical level, take this 
form? But can "yielding" ever be expressed through an active ending 
of life by one's own hand or another's? Dying holds the mystery and 
the hope that (as Teilhard de Chardin put it15) our death will be truly 
a "communion" with God. But in communion, action and passion, 
giving and receiving, embracing and letting go, become two sides of 
the same reality. 
I recently stood at the bedside of a young man dying of AIDS. He 
had fought his disease long and hard, with extraordinary intelligence 
and courage. The day came, however, when it was dear that no more 
could be done. Aggressive treatments, even technologies of sheer life 
support, were finally being overwhelmed by the forces of death. As his 
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family, friends, and physician were telling him of this dire situation, 
he said in what he could manage of a whisper, "You mean it's time to 
concede?" For him, conceding was an active surrender to God, and it 
entailed a decision to stop the technologies that were keeping him 
alive. He took no direct action (nor requested any) to end his life, 
though he chose to accept death and to cease prolonging his dying. 
Without erasing the difference between his form of letting go and a 
more active taking of his life, is it nonetheless possible that all the ele-
ments of religious acceptance could have been incorporated into one 
or the other? 
Moreover, is it not possible, at least in exceptional circumstances, 
that the law of one's nature, the law of one's being, presses one to self-
preservation in a manner whereby the whole of one's being must be 
saved? If it is possible that an individual can be in such dire straits 
that her very integrity as a self is threatened (by intractable pain, rav-
aging the spirit as well as the body), is it not justifiable in such cir-
cumstances to end one's life, to surrender it while it is still whole? 
Finally, for those who believe in the Communion of Saints, is 
there a way in which membership in community is sustained no mat-
ter how death is accepted? Is it possible that, when death becomes 
inevitable and surrend~r to God is made in the face of it, then com-
munal bonds can be preserved and not violated in an active as well as 
a passive dying-into-life? 
I raise th~se questions not to suggest that it makes no moral differ-
ence if we refuse treatment or ask for a lethal dosage of medicine; for 
I am convinced that in most circumstances it does make a difference. 
I raise the questions, rather, in order to probe the possibility of excep-
tions to a rule. I raise them also in order to expand our understanding 
of perspectives on these issues that may be different from our own. 
Now, however, let me move to the third set of issues I identified 
earlier. That is, let me consider competing assessments of the conse-
quences of legalizing voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Social Consequences of Changes in the Law 
There are many persons who argue against a change in policy and 
law in these matters not because active euthanasia or suicide are in-
trinsically wrong (wrong "in principle") but because they will be inju-
rious to society. Holders of this position point to several factors: We 
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will soon be on a very slippery slope, where what began as respect for 
some individuals' right of private choice becomes a violation of oth-
ers' right to medical care; where we create an ethos in which individu-
als are pressured, socially coerced, to choose to die rather than to live 
as a burden to others; where voluntary active euthanasia slips into in-
voluntary active euthanasia (as it has, according to some reports, in 
the Netherlands 16); where the "easy way out" short-circuits the possi-
bility of an individual and his or her family's resisting death to the 
end, companioning one another to the end, and only then surrender-
ing into God. Moreover, risks of error, and pressures to expand the 
practice of euthanasia, are greater in a society such as ours where 
medical care is inequitably distributed according to factors of race, 
economic status, geography, gender, etc.; and where there is already a 
massive breakdown in trust between patients and physicians and a cri-
sis of professional identity among medical care providers. In this view, 
then, the negative social consequences of decriminalizing voluntary 
active euthanasia and/or assisted suicide are serious indeed, and they 
weigh against any change in the law. The interests of society, not as a 
collectivity but as a community of many, finally should take priority 
over the interests of a few. 
There are, however, responses to these concerns. For example, po-
tential abuses may be limited if we craft careful safeguards against 
them (as has been attempted in legislative proposals for assisted sui-
cide that require three requests, both oral and written, medical con-
sultation, communication with family members, etc.). Besides, it is 
not as if we are currently invulnerable to abuses (for physicians are 
sometimes even now asked to write prescriptions or to provide injec-
tions that will, in a hidden way, end a patient's life; and if they re-
spond out of compassion, there is no public scrutiny of their choices 
and actions). 
Then, too, loss of spiritual depth among individuals in society is 
not inevitable should active direct taking of life in limited circum-
stances become possible; and in any case, one person's way to spiritual 
wisdom and courage is not necessarily the same as another's. There 
are other ways, besides holding the line against new legislation, for 
religious traditions to promote reverence for life, courage in the face 
of suffering, and religious meaning in death. 
Moreover, of central importance to the good of society is tolerance 
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and respect for differing moral perceptions. If a prohibition against 
active euthanasia can only be sustained "in principle" by appeals to a 
certain belief in God, or a particular interpretation of the natural law, 
then it is sustained on sectarian appeals, not on reasons grounded in a 
universal morality. Insofar as this is the case, the basic values of a 
democratic pluralistic society may be violated-by the imposition of 
this prohibition on all without a sufficient achievement of moral or 
religious consensus. Hence, in this view, the negative social conse-
quences of changes in the law are not grave enough to support an ab-
solute prohibition against the active taking of life in a medical 
context, and there may be some consequences that argue positively 
for change. 
Some Recommendations 
How shall we weigh these arguments, these analyses, and the many 
more that I have not had time to identify? My goal, as I have said, 
has not been to reach a conclusion or to advocate a position. I have 
been, on this occasion, more concerned about the process of our soci-
etal and religious discourse than on its ending. Still, I will jump ahead 
of where I have come in my analysis thus far-for the sake of hon-
esty-to signal four provisional conclusions and directions that seem 
to me defensible and important. 
(1) The concerns on all sides about dying point to some things 
that can be done without moving to active voluntary euthanasia or 
assisted suicide. What we must do, first and foremost, is to clarify the 
meaning and the effectiveness of refusal of treatment. If this is truly 
legally safeguarded, and if there is wide and deep understanding of its 
medical as well as its moral and religious possibility and power, we 
shall be able to recognize that: (a) We do have decisions to make re-
garding our death, choices to live but choices finally to surrender to 
what must be and what can even be welcomed. And (b) as Paul 
Ramsey once wrote, "If the sting of death is sin, the sting of dying is 
solitude .... Desertion is more choking than death, and more feared. 
The chief problem of the dying is how not to die alone." 17 To choose 
in the end to let go is a choice we should make with others. In the 
medical context, the most pressing need and the most effective safe-
guard against all that we fear is communication. It is to be structured 
by policy and nurtured by those who share our life. 
16 
(2) What we must also do is to press for medical progress in the 
management of pain. Along with this must come a clearer focus in 
the clinical setting on the goals of care for each individual patient-
goals that are appropriate to the individual's medical condition and 
personal values. Only so can we determine whether aggressive treat-
ments should be continued or withheld; only so can we be clear about 
the requirements of care and the possibilities of alleviating suffering. 
If we can manage these things, the situations in which there appears 
no way out but through active killing-situations that are already 
rare-will be almost nonexistent. 
(3) Yet I do not dispute that there are and will be rare circum-
stances, exceptional cases, in which intractable suffering may threaten 
the very soul of the person, and in which the active taking of life may 
be justified. Such decisions must remain the exception, however, and 
not become the rule. Whatever we must do, in law and in policy, to 
allow but to limit these actions is worthy of our discernment and our 
efforts at agreement. 
(4) The process of our discernment, whether in the political arena 
or in our own faith communities, is a process that holds a moral re-
quirement of mutual respect. We must find the ways to secure this 
respect, and through it the hope for the fruits of a discernment that 
will ultimately injure neither the individual or society. 
I end where I began: Human life has profound value; it is even 
holy. It therefore deserves utter respect. Yet death may sometimes be 
welcomed-if it is welcomed in a way that does not ignore or violate 
the requirement to respect and to value each person. The questions 
before us are questions of what that way means and what, from all of 
us, it demands. 
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